![]() ![]() It is this tendency that Ockham criticizes, for it shows that we have failed to appreciate the nature of logical predication. But 'wise' is a connotative term and although it primarily qualifies Socrates we may also take it to refer secondarily to something else, namely wisdom. 'Socrates' always 'supposits' the same entity the term is absolute. Consider, for example, the proposition 'Socrates is wise'. He says that misunderstanding of the way language works often leads us to postulate the existence of such, abstract entities. (There is no evidence that he actually used these words, though he did write "plurality is never to be assumed unless required" ). His criterion is implicit in 'Ockham's Razor' "entities are not to be multiplied more than is necessary". This is important for an understanding of his metaphysics and theory of knowledge. Ockham's views on logic and language, underpin his conceptualism (or 'nominalism') and his attack on what he sees as redundant or superfluous abstract entities. As for the truth-values of propositions, Ockham says all propositions must be determinately true or false : there can be no propositions which do not have a truth-value. But if such propositions can be translated into negative or hypothetical propositions involving possibility, then they are said to be necessary, for example, 'All the tables in this room are brown' is contingent, while 'All men are mortal' is necessary (because it means 'If there is a man he is mortal'). Contingent propositions state facts about things actually existing (as determinable by the user of the proposition). Building on Aristotelian foundations, Ockham also examined formally and extensively the logic of modalities, modal terms such as as contingency, possibility, and necessity being regarded by him as properly applicable only to propositions. It is only in its second function that a word actually relates to something other than itself. Such terms are called 'simple' ( suppositio simplex). (3) A term can be the actual concept in the mind (man as that which is common to all individual men the species man). Words functioning in this way are called 'personal' ( suppositio personalis). (2) A term can signify a particular individual, whether outside or within the mind (Socrates, this man, for example). This is the word itself considered as a sound the sound made when we utter 'man'. (1) A term can be said to be 'material' ( suppositio materialis). And he adopted the classification which had been current in the thirteenth century. Ockham says they then have a ' suppositio': they can 'stand for' things in a variety of ways. The referring characteristic of terms is brought into play when the terms are used in propositions. In other words, terms of second intention stand for terms of first intention. But terms of second intention refer to signs of other signs in the language (for example the word 'dog') or to natural signs (concepts). Terms of first intention refer to things which are not signs of a language, for example, dog, tree. Ockham adopted also the distinction between 'first intention' and 'second intention'. This common feature is called a natural sign and is the concept or meaning ( terminus conceptus) of the conventional sign. But these different signs express the same state of mind ( intentio) and thus have something in common. Categorematic terms or words, whether spoken or written, are called conventional signs in so far as it is a linguistic convention that a given thing is referred to by a particular name ( the species 'man' in English, ' homo' in Latin, for example). Thus, in 'All men are mortal' 'men' and 'mortal (thing)' are categorematic, while 'all' is syncategorematic. These are of two kinds: (1) categorematic terms, which have meaning because of their reference to real things (2) syncategorematic terms, which have only a logical function to link categorematic terms. ![]() Ockham contributed greatly to the development of the 'logic of terms' which had been introduced in the twelfth century and developed in the thirteeenth. ![]() Because of the interruption of his career he never attained professorial rank, and he therefore became known as Venerabilis Inceptor (' inceptor' being the term used to describe those awaiting the award of their teaching licence). ![]() Later, in Munich, where he was supported by the Emperor, he was again embroiled in controversy, this time concerning the issue of the relation of Church power to the state. He was accused of heresy (his writings were condemned in 1326 and he was excommunicated) and he came into conflict with the Holy See at Avignon (1324-8) over the issue of evangelical poverty. He entered the Franciscan order before studying theology at Oxford, c. William (of) Ockham was born in the village of that name in Surrey, England. ![]()
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